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This paper examines the effects of a number of methods for enhancing
private child support collections: increasing the proportion of those chil-
dren potentially eligible for child support who get child support awards;
using a uniform standard for determining child support obligations; and
collecting a greater percentage of current obligations. The paper also es-
timates the potential of all three methods used in combination to provide
income to needy custodial families.
The research demonstrates that the current private child support sys-
tem falls far short of its potential to transfer income from noncustodial to
custodial families. Although the use of a normative standard, improved
collections, and extending child support to all those potentially eligible
will greatly improve the economic circumstances of impoverished custo-
dial families, private child support cannot be viewed as the sole answer
for the economic plight of these families. Increased work opportunities
and increased public support are also needed.
Child support is an income transfer to the custodian of a
child with a living noncustodial parent. Private child support is
paid for by the noncustodial parent. Public child support is paid
for by taxpayers. During the last decade a significant amount of
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legislation has been enacted to strengthen public enforcement
of private child support. The most important legislation was
passed in 1975, when Congress established the Office of Child
Support Enforcement (OCSE) as Part D of Title IV of the So-
cial Security Act (the IV-D program). Primarily a state program
with significant federal involvement and federal funding, the
original IV-D legislation required each state to develop a child
support enforcement program providing services to all fami-
lies receiving benefits from the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program (AFDC).
Since its inception, the IV-D program has grown steadily,
and several amendments to the Social Security Act have greatly
expanded the scope of its activities. Part of this expansion has
been the extension of services to non-AFDC families. During
the period 1978 to 1985, total child support collections through
the IV-D program increased by 157% (56% in real terms), and
the program's caseload grew by 102%.1 This increase in program
activities spanned both the AFDC and non-AFDC components
of the program, although the percentage increase in the non-
AFDC component was somewhat larger. Between 1978 and 1985
collections for AFDC families rose by 131% (40% in real terms)
while collections for non-AFDC families grew by 179% (69% in
real terms). The IV-D AFDC caseload grew by 76% over this pe-
riod and the IV-D caseload of non-AFDC families grew by 260%.
Passage of the Child Support Amendments of 1984, which in-
stituted, among other things, mandatory wage withholding for
delinquent noncustodial parents, has caused continued growth
in the size of IV-D program throughout the 1980s. The recent
passage of the Family Support Act of 1988, which will institute
universal withholding by 1994, will ensure growth through the
end of this century.
The expansion of the IV-D program reflects the public's con-
cern about the growth in the number of children living with one
parent and the public cost of supporting these children when
the private child support system fails.
The potential child-support-eligible population consists of
children under the age of 18 years who have living noncus-
todial parents. In 1983 15.3 million children were living in 6.1
million families disrupted by divorce or separation and in 1.8
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million families in which the mothers had never been married.
Combined, these children represent one of every five children
in the United States today and a 35% increase in the eligible
population over 1978.2 It is estimated that more than two of ev-
ery five children born today will at some time before age 18 live
in a single-parent family and hence become potentially eligible
for private child support (Bumpass, 1984).
Under the current system of private child support, non-
custodial fathers transferred nearly $6.8 billion to the custodial
mothers of their children in 1983. This represented 70% of the
$9.7 billion legally owed. Of those families potentially eligible
for child support, only 60% had a legal child support order.
Of those legally entitled to child support, close to half received
the full amount they were owed while just over one-quarter
received nothing. Recipiency rates (proportion of the eligible
population who receive some child support) have been fairly
consistent from 1978 to 1985 (.35 to .36 respectively). 3
Partly because of the failure of the child support system
to transfer sufficient income, about one-third of all eligible
children received some form of public assistance. The largest
single source of public aid for these children is the AFDC pro-
gram, which transferred some $13.8 billion to needy families in
1983.4 This program, combined with Food Stamps, Medicaid,
and other smaller programs, cost the public more than $24 bil-
lion during 1983 for single-parent families eligible for private
child support (Garfinkel and McLanahan, 1987). In other words,
public child support cash transfers to the poor alone exceed
private child support cash transfers to all children eligible for
support by a ratio of about three to one.
In spite of these combined private and public income trans-
fers, many child-support-eligible families remain poor. In 1983
the poverty rate for all potentially eligible families was 33%
while 41% of potentially eligible single-parent families were
poor.
Given the current levels of private and public child sup-
port and the impoverished economic situation of many of these
families, two important policy questions need to be answered.
First, how much income can potentially be transferred under
the private child support system to eligible families? Second,
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what are the impacts of such increases in these private income
transfers on (a) AFDC costs and caseloads; and (b) the income
and poverty status of eligible families?
The purpose of this paper is to address these questions by
developing national estimates of private child support under
five scenarios, each of which differs in effectiveness. The five
scenarios are designed to show the impact of three means of
enhancing the private child support system: (a) improving col-
lections, (b) raising award levels, and (c) increasing the number
of awards.
Data
The 1984 Current Population Survey merged March Annual
Demographic File and April Child Support Supplement (CPS-
CSS), which provides the data for the analysis, is a match file
containing detailed micro-level data on 3,821 families eligible for
child support. All of these families have children under 18 years
of age and were potentially eligible to receive child support in
1983. The data include detailed child support information as
well as the demographic characteristics of the custodial mothers
and the economic circumstances of the custodial families. This
data file provides the most complete national data source. It is
ideally suited for the analysis because it contains data on child
support income due and received as well as AFDC participation
data, including whether the family was a full-year or part-year
recipient of AFDC.
The data file does suffer from several weaknesses that have
a direct impact on the analysis. The major weakness stems from
a complete lack of information about the noncustodial parents.
Although the data file contains a wealth of information re-
lated to child support, no attempt was made to gather data on
the noncustodial parent. Lack of income data on noncustodial
parents poses a major obstacle for the estimation of potential
transfers. This obstacle is overcome by utilizing an indirect esti-
mation methodology developed by Oellerich and Garfinkel (see
Oellerich, 1984; Oellerich and Garfinkel, 1983; and Garfinkel and
Oellerich, 1986).5
Private Child Support
Methodology: Current and Potential
Child Support Obligations
Scenarios Tested
Five scenarios for determining total current and potential
levels of private child support are tested. These scenarios are
summarized in Table 1. The first scenario serves as the bench-
mark reflecting the current level of collections. The second sce-
nario is the current obligations/perfect collections scenario. That
is, if all that is owed were paid. This provides a benchmark re-
flecting the current level of obligations.
Table 1
Scenarios for Private Child Support
1. Current private child support system
2. Current private child support with perfect collection: System
collecting 100% of current child support obligations
3. Uniform standard,* current obligation rate, and current
collection rate: Apply a uniform normative standard at the
current rate of securing awards and collect at the current
collection rate
4. Uniform standard, current obligation rate, and 100%
collection rate: Apply a uniform normative standard in those
cases with a current obligation and collect 100% of the new
obligation
5. Theoretical limits of private child support system: Apply
a uniform normative standard of ability to pay to all
potentially eligible cases and collect 100% of obligations
* The uniform standards under each of the remaining scenarios are the Wis-
consin Percentage of Income and Colorado Income Shares.
Each of the remaining three scenarios applies a uniform
normative standard of ability to pay to the income of the non-
custodial fathers to generate a hypothetical child support obli-
gation. The two normative standards chosen represent the two
most popular methods of setting award levels currently being
adopted by the states, the flat percentage-of-income model and
the income shares model. The flat percentage-of-income model
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has been adopted by 13 states. The income shares model has
been adopted by 23 states (Munsterman and Henderson, 1987).
The first standard is the Wisconsin percentage-of-income stan-
dard adopted in 1983. The obligation is simply a function of the
number of dependent children and the gross income of the non-
custodial parent. The Wisconsin standard sets the child support
obligation at 17% of gross income for one child and 25, 29, 31,
and 33% for 2, 3, 4, or 5 or more children, respectively. The sec-
ond standard is one recently proposed in an OCSE study and
adopted in the state of Colorado. The Colorado Child Support
Guidelines (Williams, 1986) determines the needs or cost of the
child(ren) based on the combined gross incomes of the custodial
and noncustodial parents. The needs of the child(ren) are then
shared proportionately by the parents based on the proportion
of gross income each receives. If a remarried custodial parent
does not have income, then one-half of a new spouse's income
is considered available for support obligations. 6
The third scenario applies the Wisconsin and Colorado stan-
dards to the noncustodial father's income in only those cases
with a current obligation. In addition, the current collection rate
is used to adjust the amount due to current levels of collection
effectiveness. 7 The fourth scenario applies both standards, as in
the prior scenario, but utilizes the collection rate of 100 per-
cent. In the fifth scenario the Wisconsin Standard and Colorado
Guidelines are applied to the income of the noncustodial father
in every potentially eligible case, regardless of whether or not
there is currently an award, and 100 percent collection effective-
ness is assumed. This scenario provides the theoretical upper
limit of private child support transfers under those standards.
Calculating the Normative Standards
The data for the first two scenarios are available directly
from the CPS-CSS data file. For the first scenario, current col-
lections, the amount reported as received by the custodial par-
ent is multiplied by the Census family weight,8 and the result
summed over all observations. The result is total current collec-
tions. The second scenario, 100% collection of what is currently
due, is calculated in the same manner. The amount of child sup-
port due, as reported in the survey, is multiplied by the Census
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family weight and summed over all observations. The result is
the total current amount of private child support due.
The methodology for determining the next three scenarios
is not as straightforward, since it is not based on current child
support obligations and collections. In order to apply the Wis-
consin standard and Colorado guidelines to the noncustodial
parents' income, the relevant income data must be available.
As stated earlier, one of the weaknesses of the CPS-CSS is the
lack of any data on the noncustodial parents. To overcome this
weakness, the income information is estimated using an indi-
rect methodology developed by Oellerich and Garfinkel (see
Oellerich, 1984; Oellerich and Garfinkel, 1983; and Garfinkel
and Oellerich, 1989). The method uses the characteristics of the
women as proxies for the men's characteristics and an adjusted
estimated relationship between wives' characteristics and hus-
bands' income.9
To simulate the third child support scenario, the Wisconsin
standard and the Colorado guidelines are applied to the esti-
mated incomes of the noncustodial fathers who are currently
obligated to pay support. The amount due based on the Wis-
consin standard is simulated by simply multiplying the noncus-
todial father's income by the rate appropriate for the number
of eligible dependent children. This amount is then multiplied
by the current collection rate for the case to obtain the amount
of expected transfer. The result for each sample case is then
multiplied by the Census family weight and summed over all
observations.
To simulate the Colorado guidelines for this scenario, the
estimate of the noncustodial parent's income is combined with
the total nonwelfare income of the custodial parent. If a remar-
ried custodial parent has no income of her own, then one-half
of the new spouse's income is deemed to be hers. The result-
ing total income is used to determine the child(ren)'s level of
need. The standard of need, "Schedule of Basic Child Sup-
port," is provided as part of the guidelines and is based on
the estimated cost of raising a child for given income levels.
The noncustodian's obligation is determined by multiplying the
need by the ratio of the noncustodian's income to the total in-
come of the parents. The amount due is then multiplied by the
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current collection rate for the case to obtain the amount of ex-
pected transfer. The result for each sample case is then weighted
by the Census family weight and the results summed over all
observations.
The fourth scenario demonstrates the upper limit of private
child support for those families currently due child support. The
scenario applies the Wisconsin and Colorado standards, to de-
termine levels of support, to only those families with a current
support order. The collection rate is set at 100%. This allows a
direct comparison between the current system of setting awards
and the normative standards. In the fifth scenario the stan-
dards are applied to every case without regard to prior award
or payment status. This scenario provides the upper limits of
the private child support system if the Wisconsin or Colorado
standards were universally applied and 100% of the resulting
obligations were collected.
Results: Current and Potential Levels
of Private Child Support
The results of the simulations of current and potential lev-
els of private child support appear in Table 2. The scenarios
are represented in the rows of the tables. The three columns
of the tables contain the results for the eligible families under
each scenario, families not receiving AFDC, and AFDC recipi-
ent families.
Scenario 3 clearly illustrates the gains in private child sup-
port if current awards were set by and/or updated using ei-
ther the Wisconsin or Colorado standards and current collection
rates were maintained. Under the Wisconsin standard, trans-
fers would double, an increase of $6.5 billion, to $13.33 billion.
The Colorado standard would result in a 64% increase in trans-
fers from the noncustodial fathers. Thus substantial increases in
private child support transfers would be possible under this sce-
nario. The fourth scenario demonstrates the effects of substitut-
ing for existing awards, obligations set by and/or periodically
adjusted using either the Wisconsin or Colorado standard, and
100% collection effectiveness. The use of the Wisconsin standard
Private Child Support
Table 2
Current Versus Potential Private Child Support Transfers (billions of 1983
dollars)
Total Families
Eligible Not on Families
Families AFDC on AFDC
Scenario (1) (2) (3)
1. Current transfers 6.83 6.26 .57
(3.84) (3.21) (.63)
2. Current obligations 9.86 8.52 1.16
(3.84) (3.21) (.63)
3. Uniform standard; current
obligors; current collection rate
Wisconsin 13.33 12.50 .83
Colorado 11.22 10.40 .82
(3.84) (3.21) (.63)
4. Uniform standard; current
obligors; 100% collection
Wisconsin 19.58 17.94 1.64
Colorado 16.70 15.07 1.63
(3.84) (3.21) (.63)
5. Theoretical upper limit
Wisconsin 32.44 28.01 4.43
Colorado 28.03 23.92 4.11
(7.89) (5.82) (2.07)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the number of eligible families (in millions)
with an obligation.
would double existing award levels (row 2). When combined
with 100% collection, the use of the Wisconsin standard would
almost triple current payments (row 1). The impact of the Col-
orado guidelines would be somewhat smaller though still very
substantial; an increase of $7.0 billion over current award levels.
It cannot be ascertained from the data if these differences are
due to initially low award levels, the lack of systematic peri-
odic updating, or some combination of the two.10 These results
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demonstrate that the current ability of noncustodial fathers to
pay child support, as measured by the Wisconsin and Colorado
standards, is not adequately tapped by the current system of
establishing and updating award levels.
The last scenario provides the most striking results. When
compared to the current situation (rows 1 and 2), the current
system of setting and collecting private child support does not
approach the theoretical upper limits. A perfect system would
be capable of transferring from $28 to $32 billion, depending
upon which standard was applied. This is almost three times
what is currently due (row 2) and more than four times what
is transferred under the current system (row 1).
The differences in potential child support transfers between
those currently with an award and those without an award can
be gleaned from the fourth and fifth scenarios (rows 4 and 5).
Under the Wisconsin standard, the 3.84 million families who
currently have an award have potential child support income
of $19.58 billion. The child support potential income for the 4.05
million families without a current award is $12.86 billion. Thus
the 51% of the eligible population without an award has only
40% of the total child support income potential. The proportions
of the child support income potential for the Colorado stan-
dard are almost identical. There may be several concomitant
reasons for this discrepancy. First and foremost is the lower
incomes of the noncustodial fathers of those without awards.
Second, many families without an award are headed by never-
married mothers; thus there are fewer children per family on
average. In addition, never-married men have lower incomes
than ever-married men. Third, a disproportionate number of
those families without an award are black, and black males have
lower incomes vis-A-vis white males.
The aggregate results are further broken down into non-
AFDC and AFDC families (columns 2 and 3, respectively)
because ability to pay and collection effectiveness may differ
substantially by the AFDC status of the custodial family. Several
findings are worth highlighting. First, the effect of the standards
on award levels differs dramatically between the two groups
(compare rows 2 and 4). The Wisconsin standard would result in
a 111% increase in award levels for families not receiving AFDC,
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while for families receiving AFDC the increase is just 41%. The
Colorado standard would result in a 77% increase for families
not receiving AFDC and 41% for those receiving AFDC. These
differences in the impact of the standards between families not
on AFDC and families that are recipients of AFDC may reflect
the regressive nature of the current system of setting award lev-
els. That is, it appears that low-income noncustodial fathers of
children receiving AFDC have obligations closer to their ability
to pay as measured by either standard than do their non-AFDC
counterparts.
Second, the effects of a perfect system (row 5) are far more
dramatic, in percentage terms, for families on AFDC than for
those not on AFDC. This indicates the difficulty currently
encountered in securing awards and collecting private child
support for AFDC families. The upper limit of child support uti-
lizing the Wisconsin standard is $4.4 billion or a 677% increase
over current collections. The results for the Colorado standard
are equally impressive, with child support totaling $4.11 bil-
lion or 621% more than is currently transferred. For families not
receiving AFDC the effects of this perfect system which incorpo-
rated the Wisconsin standard would result in a 347% increase in
transfers, to $28 billion, over current collections, whereas incor-
porating the Colorado standard would result in a 282% increase,
to $23.9 billion.
The results displayed in Table 2 demonstrate impressive
gains in private child support. These gains result from the im-
provement in securing awards and collecting performance com-
bined with the universal application of the Wisconsin or
Colorado standards. Overall, the potential of the private child
support system (as measured by the two standards analyzed)
far outweighs its current performance. Current transfers are but
one-fifth to one-fourth of the theoretical limits of the private
system, whereas current obligations tap just one-third of these
limits. If current obligations were replaced by obligations both
set by and updated to the Wisconsin or Colorado standards and
collection was 100% effective, approximately three-fifths of the
theoretical limits of private child support would be potentially
available to custodial families. The dollar potential for families
not on AFDC is far more dramatic than for those who are AFDC
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recipients, yet in percentage terms the potential increase is far
greater for AFDC families. This reflects the lower incomes of
noncustodial fathers of AFDC families and the difficulties in-
herent in securing private support for these families.
Methodology for the Simulation of Economic Impacts
Eight economic impacts of private child support transfers
are estimated. AFDC impacts are assessed on three outcomes:
(a) total number of families receiving AFDC; (b) total months
that all families are on AFDC (family/months of AFDC); and (c)
total AFDC benefits paid. Impacts on the economic well-being of
families are measured by five outcomes: (a) mean child support
income; (b) mean total family income; (c) number of poor per-
sons in families potentially eligible for child support; (d) overall
poverty rate for this group; and (e) their overall poverty gap.
Impacts on AFDC Participation
The simulation of the AFDC outcomes is based on the AFDC
participation model developed by Robins (1986). This AFDC
participation model serves two purposes. First, it is used to
predict the number of months in the year a part-year recipi-
ent family has received AFDC benefits and the amount of the
monthly AFDC benefit. Second, the model is used to estimate
the impacts of modified private child support transfers for both
full- and part-year AFDC recipients.
The participation model is based on the assumption the
families participate in the AFDC program if it improves their
well-being. Implicit in the theoretical model are the behavioral
responses to child support. That is, the theoretical model implies
that receiving child support reduces the probability of being
dependent on AFDC. The magnitude of the reduction depends
upon not only the magnitude of the change in net nonwage in-
come (e.g., child support) but also net wage income and other
nonearned income.11-
To predict the current number of months for part-year par-
ticipants, the coefficients estimated in the participation model
are combined with the characteristics of the families who are
current recipients of AFDC. This produces a prediction of the
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proportion of the year a family participates in the program. The
result is then multiplied by 12 to obtain the current number of
months of program participation. The reported AFDC benefit is
then divided by the number of months to obtain the monthly
AFDC benefit. For full-year recipients, the reported AFDC ben-
efit is divided by 12 to obtain the monthly benefit.
The simulation of the AFDC impacts under the five sce-
narios has two parts. First, the monthly private child support
amount is compared to the monthly AFDC benefit. If the child
support amount exceeds the AFDC benefit, then the family is
no longer eligible for AFDC because of the 100 percent marginal
tax rate the AFDC program imposes on child support income.
Because the first $50 of child support received monthly is not
taxed by the AFDC program, all AFDC simulations incorpo-
rate a $50 monthly set-aside. The second part of the simu-
lation methodology is applied to those families whose child
support benefits are smaller than the AFDC benefit. The simu-
lation differs for part-year and full-year AFDC recipients. For
part-year recipients, the Robins model is used to predict the
proportion of the year a family participates in the AFDC pro-
gram under each scenario. The result is multiplied by 12 to
obtain the number of months a family participates. The cost
of the AFDC program is obtained by multiplying the number
of months by the monthly AFDC benefit. Note that part-year
participants can increase as well as decrease their participation
under alternative scenarios if estimated child support is below
current levels.
Full-year recipients are assumed to differ in their AFDC par-
ticipation response to changes in child support income. That
is, some full-year families may be more entrenched in the pro-
gram than others. The simulation methodology accounts for this
entrenchment by incorporating a measure of the variability in
response; the measure is the estimated error variance from the
estimation of the Robins AFDC participation model.
Given the number of months a family participates in the
AFDC program and their monthly AFDC benefit, the compu-
tation of the three outcome measures is straightforward. First,
the total number of AFDC families is a weighted count of all
families who have a positive AFDC benefit under each scenario.
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Second, the total number of family/months of AFDC participa-
tion under each scenario is the number of months each family
participates in the program multiplied by the Census family
weight and summed over all observations. The third outcome
measure, total AFDC benefits, is computed by multiplying, for
each observation, the monthly AFDC benefit by the number
of months of program participation times the Census family
weight and summing over all observations.
Impacts on Economic Well-Being of Custodial Families
The five outcome measures of family economic well-being
include (a) the mean private child support transfer; (b) the mean
custodial family income; (c) the number of poor persons in fami-
lies potentially eligible for child support; (d) the overall poverty
rate for these families; and (e) their total poverty gap. Mean
private child support transfer is computed by dividing the total
private child support generated under each of the five scenarios
by the total number of families with a child support award un-
der each scenario. Mean custodial family income is calculated
by computing the total family income for each family, summing
over all Census family weighted observations and dividing by
the total weighted number of families. The total custodial-family
income for each family is the total of all earned and unearned
income, including private child support and/or AFDC income.
For those families who were AFDC recipients during all or part
of the year, total family income includes the maximum of either
the child support or AFDC transfer for each month multiplied
by the number of months, taking into account the $50 AFDC
set-aside. The monthly child support transfer is simply the to-
tal child support due under a given scenario divided by 12,
while the monthly AFDC benefit is determined by the AFDC
simulation presented above.
The number of poor persons in families potentially eligible
for child support, the third outcome measure, is the weighted
count of all persons in those families whose total welfare and
nonwelfare income is below the official poverty line appropri-
ate for family size. The poverty rate is computed by dividing
the total number of these poor persons by the total number
of all poor and nonpoor persons in custodial families. The last
Private Child Support
measure, the poverty gap, is determined for all custodial fami-
lies whose total income is below the poverty line by subtracting
the total family income from the poverty line. The result is
weighted by the Census family weight and summed over all
observations of custodial families under the poverty line.
Simulation Results
Impacts of Private Child Support on AFDC
The results for the simulation of the AFDC impacts of pri-
vate child support appear in Table 3. The five child support
scenarios are represented in the five rows of the table, and the
columns contain the three outcome measures. Under the current
system of private child support 2.07 million families report re-
ceiving at least some AFDC assistance during the year. The total
number of family/months of AFDC participants is 21.3 million
months, and the total reported benefits transferred to these fam-
ilies come to $6.5 billion. If all that were owed to these families
in private child support under the current system were paid
(row 2), then the number of AFDC recipient families would
be reduced by 4.8%, the number of family/months reduced by
4.6%, and the total AFDC benefits reduced by 3.5%; these results
are similar to Robins's (1986) estimates.
Under a perfect system of private child support reflected in
the scenario giving theoretical limits (row 5), AFDC participa-
tion would decline by 16 to 17%, or more than a quarter of a
million families. AFDC benefit transfers would decrease by 30
to 33%, depending upon the uniform standard employed. This
decrease in benefits amounts to a saving of $1.97 to $2.15 billion,
again depending upon the normative standard. The number of
family-participation months would decrease by more than 3.5
million, utilizing either the Wisconsin or Colorado standards.
The replacement of current awards with obligations established
using either the Wisconsin or Colorado standards and collecting
100% (row 4) would result in a saving of more than $570 million
in AFDC expenditures and a reduction of 170,000 to 190,000 in
the number of AFDC families.
In sum, the results displayed in Table 3 indicate that private
child support has the potential to make significant reductions
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Table 3
Impact of Potential Private Child Support Transfers on AFDC
Number of Total Family AFDC
AFDC Familes Months on AFDC Expenditures
(millions) (millions) ($1983 billions)
1. Current transfers 2.07 21.30 6.50
2. Current obligations 1.97 (4.8) 20.31 (4.6) 6.27 (3.5)
3. Uniform standard;
current obligors;
current collection
rate
Wisconsin 2.01 (2.7) 20.78 (2.5) 6.39 (1.8)
Colorado 2.01 (3.1) 20.68 (2.9) 6.38 (1.8)
4. Uniform standard;
current obligors;
100% collection
Wisconsin 1.90 (8.5) 19.55 (8.3) 5.93 (8.9)
Colorado 1.88 (9.1) 19.38 (9.1) 5.91 (9.2)
5. Theoretical limit
Wisconsin 1.74 (16.0) 17.77 (16.8) 4.35 (33.1)
Colorado 1.72 (16.8) 17.45 (18.1) 4.53 (30.4)
Note Numbers in parentheses are the percentage reduction in each measure
from the current payment scenario (row 1). Percentages are based on un-
rounded numbers.
in AFDC caseloads and costs. Also, it is obvious from these
simulations that private child support is not a panacea. It will
not replace the AFDC program; even at the limits of private
child support, in excess of 80% of the caseload and two-thirds
of the costs would remain.
Economic Well-Being of Families
Potentially Eligible for Child Support
Table 4 contains the results of the simulations of the five
private child support scenarios on the economic well-being of
potentially eligible families. Again, the rows of the table repre-
sent the five scenarios while the columns contain the outcome
measures.
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Table 4
Economic Impacts of Potential Private Child Support Transfers on Custodial Families
Mean
Private
Child Mean Poverty
Support Total Number Poverty Gap
Transfers Income Poor Rate ($1983
Scenario ($1983) ($1983) (millions) (%) billions)
1. Current transfers 1,779 9,542 10.16 38.9 13.64
2. Current obligations 2,552 9,864 9.92 (2.4) 38.0 13.02 (4.6)
3. Uniform standard;
current obligors;
current collection
rate
Wisconsin 3,473 10,397 9.56 (5.9) 36.6 12.72 (6.8)
Colorado 2,923 10,124 9.61 (5.4) 36.8 12.79 (6.3)
4. Current standard;
current obligors;
100% collection
Wisconsin 5,099 11,264 9.23 (9.1) 35.3 12.18 (10.7)
Colorado 4,348 10,717 9.23 (9.1) 35.3 12.23 (10.4)
5. Theoretical limit
Wisconsin 4,110 12,514 8.26 (18.7) 31.6 9.38 (31.2)
Colorado 3,552 11,919 8.28 (18.5) 31.7 9.56 (29.9)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the percentage reduction in each measure
from the current payment scenario (row 1). Percentages are based on un-
rounded numbers.
The results displayed in Table 4 indicate that private child
support has the potential to make important inroads in better-
ing the impoverished economic conditions of these families. If
the private system could effectively secure all that is currently
owed to these families (row 2) the poverty rate would be re-
duced by nearly 1 percentage point (or a quarter of a million
persons) and the poverty gap would decline by $620 million. Of
course this impact pales when compared to the limits of the sys-
tem employing either alternative normative standard (row 5).
In this scenario mean family income would increase by more
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than $2000, while 1.9 million persons would be lifted out of
poverty. The poverty rate would fall more than 7.2 percentage
points to about 32%, depending upon the standard employed.
The poverty gap would be reduced by at least 30%. The ef-
fects of modifying existing orders plus 100% collection can be
gleaned from the fourth scenario (row 4). This scenario would
result in a reduction of 930,000 in the number of poor persons
and reduce the poverty gap by more than $1.4 million or 10%.
Overall, private child support has the potential to produce sig-
nificant reductions in the impoverished economic situation of
many families potentially eligible for child support. Yet the fact
remains in the face of these improvements that more than 31%
of all persons living in families potentially eligible for child
support would remain poor under even the most optimistic of
scenarios.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Several important conclusions can be drawn from this re-
search. First, the current private child support system falls far
short of its potential to transfer income from noncustodial to
custodial families. While the current system transfers 71% of
current total obligations, these current obligations account for
30 to 34% of the theoretical upper limits of private child sup-
port defined by two uniform normative standards adopted in
Wisconsin and Colorado. Second, the use of a uniform norma-
tive standard would result in substantial increases in private
child support transfers, even if there were no other systematic
improvements in child support awards or collection rates. The
use of standards may alleviate perceived inequities and result
in improved payment behavior on the part of noncustodians.
Of course, if obligations as a proportion of income increase,
there is a possibility that payment behavior may decline. There-
fore improved collection mechanisms such as automatic income
withholding should be required. The passage of the 1984 Social
Security Amendments requiring individual states to establish
uniform normative standards is a step toward more equitable
obligations within states. In addition, the 1988 Family Support
Act requires states to institute universal income withholding
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by 1994. Wisconsin, followed by several other states, including
Arizona and Texas, has already adopted such laws.
Third, although private child support has the potential to
make inroads in reducing the AFDC dependence and impover-
ished economic circumstances of eligible families, a significant
number of families would remain dependent and/or poor. Pri-
vate child support cannot be viewed as the sole answer for the
economic plight of these families. If their economic situation
is to be alleviated, it must be attacked by a program which
combines increased work opportunities with increased public
support and improved private child support.
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Notes
1 These percentages and those in the remainder of this paragraph were
computed by the authors using data reported by the Office of Child Sup-
port Enforcement in their annual reports to Congress. Dollar increases have
been adjusted using the consumer price index to determine real growth. U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Child Support Enforce-
ment (1982 and 1985).
2 The numbers in this paragraph were computed by the authors from
the microdata tapes for the 1979 and 1984 Current Population Survey Matched
March Demographic File and April Child Support Supplement.
3 Recipiency rates computed by the authors from U.S. Bureau of the
Census (1985, 1989); Table A.
4 The source for these data is U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Social Security Administration, 1985, Table 196.
5 Several other weaknesses of the data source include the following:
first, the child support data were obtained from women 18 and over, thereby
excluding women under 18 with children eligible for child support. Second,
data were collected for the most recent divorce or separation, thereby exclud-
ing information concerning child-support eligibles from prior unions. These
two weaknesses combined result in an undercount of potential eligible fam-
ilies, the amounts of child support owed and collected, and the amount of
AFDC assistance paid to families eligible for child support.
The fourth weakness results from the annual reporting of both AFDC
and child support. Annual reporting creates a problem when one tries to
adjust family incomes from increases in child support and concomitant de-
creases in AFDC payments, because AFDC uses a monthly accounting period.
This weakness is overcome by incorporating into the microsimulation mod-
els a monthly AFDC participation model developed by Robins (1986). The
fifth weakness is due to presumed underreporting of private child support
by AFDC recipients. This may occur because AFDC recipients do not directly
receive private child support payments. Upon acceptance of AFDC assistance,
the eligible family assigns its rights to child support to the state, which then re-
ceives payments from the noncustodian, so it is likely that the custodial family
is unaware of the amount paid to the state. Furthermore, payments received
directly by the family may go unreported, since disclosure would subject the
mother to the 100% tax rate imposed by the states on child support in excess
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of $50 per month. An upper-bound estimate of the underreporting in 1983 is
35%. This is the ratio of the difference between that reported in the survey
($.57 billion) and the amount reported by OCSE for fiscal 1983 ($.88 million) to
the OCSE amount. The CPS figure is based on 2.07 million families, whereas
the OCSE figure is based on an AFDC caseload of 5.83 million families. In
addition, the OCSE amount includes arrears collected during the fiscal year.
6 We do not adjust incomes for prior support obligations or health insur-
ance premiums. Neither work-related child care expenses nor extraordinary
educational and health expenses are included in the child(ren)'s needs as pro-
vided for in the guidelines.
7 The current collection rate for each case is the ratio of current amount
paid to current amount due as reported by the custodial mother.
8 The Census family weight is the sample weight provided in the mi-
crodata tape which is used to produce population estimates from the sample
data.
9 An appendix providing detail of this methodology will be sent to the
reader upon request.
10 Work in determining the effect of inflation and other factors on the
erosion in the value of awards under the current system is currently under
way; see Robins (1989).
11 The coefficients used in this paper are updated estimates of Robins's
original model and are based on data from three CPS-CSS match files, for
1979, 1982, and 1984 (the original Robins, 1986, estimates are based only on
the 1982 match file). The methodology used to derive the updated estimates
is described in Robins (1987). Because the 1979 CPS-CSS match file doesn't
identify number of months on AFDC during the survey year, a probit model
(rather than a tobit model) is used to estimate the updated (normalized) co-
efficients. The standard error used in the simulations for this paper is taken
from the original tobit estimates given in Robins (1986).

